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Since 1953, Turkey's trade and payments regime has never been fully
liberalized. The degree of restrictiveness has been modified with changes in
the instruments used for control and with alterations in the manner that
existing controls were exercised. And the purposes that the payments regime
was intended to serve have been altered from time to time.
When controls were first imposed in the early 1950's they were intended
to suppress the emerging balance-of.payments deficit. The "planlessness" that
characterizedthe Menderes Government pervaded the payments.control
mechanism, and the increasing restrictiveness of the regime before 1958 was
largely the unintended outcome of measures taken as ad hoc responses to
declining foreign exchange earnings and increasingly limited borrowing oppor.
tunities.
The Turkish experience of 1953—1958 probably has little relevancy for
other countries. The inflation, SEE deficit, inflation cycle into which Turkey
plunged was the outcome of particularly unfortunate economic policies. The
causes of the cycle were obvious at the time, and it was the deliberate refusal
of the Prime Minister and those about him to accept economic realities that
led to the difficulties. The only pertinent lesson from all this may be that
political leaders are free to disregard whatever they wish, at least in the short
run.
The Stabilization Program of 1958 was as drastic as the inflationary cycle
that preceded it —and,unlike the 1953—1958 experience, it is instructive for
other situations. For the episode provides an instance of a country's transfor-
mation from rapid inflation to price stability. That transformation was ac-
complished primarily through a sharp shift from rapid expansion of the
money supply to gradual contraction. A huge increase in the flow of imports
and the deflationary effects of net revenues from foreign trade taxes aug-
mented the primary effect of the shift in the rate of expansion of the money
supply.
The transition to price stability was not painless, although the evidence
seems to indicate that had the Stabilization Program not been reversed in
1959 the reallocation of resources that was necessary after the dislocations of
the mid-l950's might have been accompanied by a very short-lived and mild
recession. The abandonment of the Stabilization Program in 1959 meant that
when it was resumed after the Revolution in May of 1960 a second recession
ensued, which was intensified if not prolonged by political uncertainties.Ls regime has never been fully
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Thesecond major lesson emerging from Turkey's experience with the
Stabilization Program is that there appears to be a substantial lag in the
response of exports to an altered incentive structure. Exports did not increase
maikedly after the adoption of the Stabilization Program, even if allowance is
made for the fact that export EERs were not immediately increased by the
full amount of the nominal devaluation. But exports grew rapidly from 1959
to 1964, reversing the downward trend of earlier years. In view of the fact
that there were no changes in export incentives after the Stabilization Pro-
gram until 1963 (and then the only change was the introduction of export
rebates, which did not assume importance until the latter half of the 1960's),
the resumed growth of export earnings must be attributed largely to the
altered export EERs which were a part of the Stabilization Program.
As seen in Chapter VII, there are many commodities produced in Turkey
which are either exports or potential exports for which domestic policies
pursued by the government essentially determine production and distribu-
tion. (1) Many agricultural commodities are subject to domestic price sup-
ports which are unrelated to international prices at the prevailing exchange
rate. In addition, consumer prices are often set. The Turkish excess supply of
those commodities is thus a function of the price paid to producers and that
paid by consumers, and not of the relevant EER. (2) Minerals are generally
produced by SEEs which have not been forced to behave as profit maxi-
mizers. The minerals sector has generally not responded to export incentives.
When evaluated in the context of those domestic policies, the export
response to the altered PLD-EERs in the early 1960's was really quite size-
able. The regression estimates given in Chapter VII (Table Vu-I 3) suggest
that cotton, mohair, olive oil and minor exports, the commodities in which
government intervention policies have not been dominant —haveexhibited
considerable responsiveness to altered real EERs. A 1per cent increase in
the PLD-EER of each commodity has led to at least a 1 per cent increase
in the quantity exported. Since Turkey has little or no monopoly power for
any of those products, that implies at least a1 per cent increase in foreign
exchange earnings from them in response to a1per cent increase in the
PLD-EER.
There are a number of reasons for believing that those estimates of export
responsiveness understate Turkish export potential. But the experience of the
1960's should be discussed first.Itis important to note that the Import
Programs, introduced as the control mechanism for imports in the Stabiliza-
tion Program, were employed throughout the 1960's as the regulatory instru-
ment for imports, although the purposes the regulations were designed to
achieve altered. At first the Import Programs were seen as a means whereby
the payments-arrears situation of the 19 50's could be prevented from re-268 Conclusions I Conclusions
curring. The initial intent was of course that imports would gradually be
transferred to the Liberalized List so that the regime would become less and
less over time.
The purposes which the Import Programs were designed to serve altered
markedly when planning started. They became a major instrument for en-
couraging domestic production, particularly of import-substitutes. The "Pro-
hibited List" emerged as an indiscriminate device for granting protection to
any new industry. But there was no mechanism for making protection tempo-
rary.
As industrialization progressed, the lists of eligible imports became increas-
ingly complex. New categories of intermediate goods were added to the lists
and imports with domestic substitutes were deleted. To gain better control
over the uses to which imports were destined, ministerial permission require-
ments were added to import licensing procedures.
The outcome was that the Import Programs, initially intended as a means
of liberalizing the import regime, were gradually transformed into one for
restricting it. To complete the transformation, the Liberalized List was, by
1969, regarded by many as at least as restrictive as the Quota List. Thus
inspection of the mechanism by which a trade regime is administered tells
little about the restrictiveness of that regime. The Turkish mechanism has
remained the same for a period of more than a decade, while the restrictive
content of that mechanism has altered substantially.
The side effects of the import regime upon excess capacity, inventory
holdings and the capital-labor ratio were discussed in some detail in Chap-
ter VIII. The evidence indicates that the excess costs of production resulting
from the system were probably sizeable, especially in view of the limited
degree to which quantification of those effects is possible. But those excess
costs appear to have been small as compared with the costs of indiscriminate
encouragement of new firms and industries.
The direct and indirect effects of the incentives provided by the import
regime resulted in the emergence of a wide range of DRCs within and be-
tween industries. As the data in Table VIII-l show, DRCs ranged from very
low to extremely high. Of the number of factors undoubtedly contributing to
this wide variation, several were probably especially important. (1) As em-
phasized repeatedly, the protection afforded by the "Prohibited List" was
indiscriminate in the extreme, and precluded competition from abroad at any
price. (2) The mechanism for allocating the Quota List imports essentially
determined firms' market shares at each point in time. (3) Since few capacity
additions could be undertaken without imports, government control over new
investments was achieved through the import regime and, in the late 1960's,
through administration of sizeable investment incentives. That control re-
sulted in an inability of relatively low-cost firms to expand as much as they
otherwise would have and th
cient firms.
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otherwisewould have and thereby provided sheltered positions to less effi-
cient firms.
In addition to the observable losses associated with the trade regime, there is
the important question as to the sort of growth Turkey could have achieved had
the growth strategy been less import-substitution oriented. An attempt was
made in Chapter IX to answer that question. "What-would-have-happened-if'
estimates are always open to debate, but the assumptions made in Chapter IX
are fairly conservative. By accepting each sector's coefficients as given, an
important part of the gains that might have accrued with a development
strategy more oriented toward growth of exports was omitted from the analy-
sis. For example, Turkish industry developed in a sellers' market atmosphere,
devoid of pressures to become internationally competitive. Under an alterna-
tive strategy, competitive pressures would have been greater. The relative
inattention to quality control among Turkish producers may be another ex-
ample. In a more open economy, there might have been greater efforts in that
direction. Similarly, Turkey has had relatively little indigenous research and
development. This too might have been stimulated had Turkish producers
been forced into greater competition with their European counterparts.
Even without taking potential gains of this type into account, one sees
that the estimates of Chapter IX indicate that a BEPIM, or even MIS, growth
path could have resulted in a sizeable increase in the rate of growth of
manufacturing output and employment, a reduction in the ICOR, reduced
import demands for any level of output, and increased export earnings. The
estimated magnitude of the gains is impressive, and the results clearly suggest
that such an alternative strategy could better have achieved the goals of
Turkish policy-makers than did the development path actually chosen.
In response to the results of the analysis in Chapter IX, most Turkish
economists and plarmers would probably regard the export-oriented alterna-
tive as having been infeasible. The widely held view in Turkey is that Turkish
manufacturing exports simply cannot compete in international markets. The
conclusion reached in Chapter VII and the magnitude of the potential gain
estimated in Chapter IX make that argument doubtful. But no decisive proof
can be given unless a genuine and sustained effort is made to compete in
international markets. It may well be, though, that Turkish producers' inabili-
ty to compete is more the result of the trade regime than the cause. The
extreme disincentive to export, in favor of the handsome rewards for import.
substitution during the past decade, is enough to make one wonder whether a
rational, profit-maximizing entrepreneur would have found itin his self-
interest to attempt to develop a sizeable export business.
Turkey's decision to enter the Common Market makes the question of her
potential growth under an alternative, export-oriented development strategy
an extremely important one. Given her past import-substitution orientation,
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there are two factors to be considered. The first is the manner in which a
transition to an export-oriented strategy is effected. The second is the nature
of the gains that might be achieved once the transition is accomplished.
The results of Chapter IX shed some light on the second factor. For all the
evidence of Chapters VIto IX indicates that, satisfactory as Turkey's growth
performance has been, it could be substantially improved if some of the
excess costs of indiscriminate import-substitution were avoided in the future
and her export potential were realized.
The problem of transition will be much more difficult. Over the past two
decades new industries have been built up regardless of their long.run poten-
tial in response to the incentives provided to them. Many of the firms in
these new industries would be confronted with difficult problems of transi-
tion.
Those problems have not been considered here because analysis has been
centered upon past developments. The lesson of those developments is that
the benefits from an altered growth strategy will more than compensate for
the costs of that transition.